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Chapter 5
Experimental Economies and Tax Evasion: 
The Order Beyond the Market
Juliana Bernhofer
In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death 
and taxes.
Benjamin Franklin
5.1  Introduction
Tax non-compliance and fiscal fraud are giving policymakers all over the world 
quite a headache, leading them to invest significant efforts and resources in the at-
tempt to tackle the issue of public revenues lost due to tax evasion.
To achieve meaningful results through targeted policy interventions, it is cen-
tral to understand how people perceive taxes, contributions, and sanctions, along 
with how they take the decision to comply. Various attempts have been made, start-
ing from the seminal contributions of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki 
(1974), who follow the paradigms of expected utility theory. These two classical 
theoretical models are presented in Sect. 5.2, as they serve as a starting point for 
the majority of further developments in the tax-compliance literature. Despite their 
elegance and insightfulness, the classical models were soon questioned as it was 
shown that their predictions did not match existing empirical evidence (see, for ex-
ample, Graetz and Wilde 1985). In fact, people were found to evade much less than 
what would have been expected from a rational utility maximizer with a reasonable 
level of risk aversion. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 deal with issues related to the assump-
tion of full rationality and the potential problems arising with the use of expected 
utility theory.
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The process of cross-checking real data with model prescriptions and the ac-
knowledgment of the limitations of analytic solutions led to modifying the basic 
research question from, “Why and by how much do people evade taxes?” to “Why 
do people pay taxes at all?” The answer should ultimately enable policy makers to 
find a solution to their old dilemma of, “How can compliance be increased even 
more?”
However, determining the extent of tax evasion is and has always been an un-
derstandably challenging task. There are four main methods, according to Andreoni 
et al. (1998): audit data, survey data, tax amnesty data, and laboratory experiments.
A frequently cited source associated with the first category is the Tax Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP) carried out by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) from 1965 to 1988. The TCMP was a program of intensive audits designed to 
measure the level of noncompliance among the population. The results of the 1988 
TCMP show that 40 % of the households evaded some income tax, whereas 53 % 
were fully compliant. The remaining 7 % instead paid more than what they actually 
owed.
Yet available data on tax compliance is limited and often unreliable. Audit data 
does not give sufficient insights, as it is nearly impossible to detect all hidden in-
come. Survey data, on the other hand, is self-reported, which casts reasonable doubt 
on the truthfulness of the information provided about one’s own illicit behavior. To 
overcome these and other limitations, experimental economics comes into play in 
the attempt to provide at least a partial fix. By carefully constructing a laboratory 
environment as described by an economic model (e.g., tax rate, audit frequency, 
fine rate), the experimenter may observe whether participants behave according 
to the analytical predictions. Furthermore, marginal effects of single-parameter 
changes can be isolated ceteris paribus, thanks to the controlled setting of the lab. 
In Sect. 5.5, we will present some results obtained from laboratory experiments on 
tax compliance.
The body of literature on tax evasion has grown to massive proportions during 
the last three decades and has become cumbersome to overlook. However, two of 
the main common findings are that individuals are not homogeneous in preferences 
and often do not act according to market-based mechanisms. Yet the plurality of 
stylized determinants of tax compliance and the discovery of the importance of 
interaction effects and dynamic approaches have given rise to new ways of model-
ing. Some examples of computer-simulated agent-based models applied to the tax 
evasion problem are illustrated in Sect. 5.6. The potential benefit of calibrating such 
models with the results stemming from real “agents” tested in controlled laboratory 
settings still has to be further explored. This new area of interaction between both 
Experimental Economics and computer-simulated realities—or an Experimental 
Economy—could well be one innovative tool to bridge the gap between theoretical 
modeling and reality on one side, while decreasing the distance between academics 
and policy makers on the other, thanks to the creation of manipulable interfaces that 
are also intuitive for non-technical users.
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5.2  Classic Modeling of Tax Evasion
A classic approach to the problem of tax evasion is offered by the theoretical model 
contained in the seminal article of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (henceforth AS). 
The model is an adaptation of Gary Becker’s work on the Economics of Crime 
and Punishment (Becker 1974) to the case of tax compliance. The decision on how 
much to declare of a certain exogenously given income is presented as a gamble 
with two possible outcomes: being caught and not being caught. The tax authority 
audits the taxpayer and discovers the understatement with a certain probability p; 
hence the decision-maker maximizes his expected utility (EU) with respect to the 
declared amount x according to the following convex combination:
  (5.1) 
His overall expected utility is represented as a weighted average of the utilities as-
signed to the two possible outcomes. The optimum amount of declared income x 
depends on the proportional tax rate t , the fine rate θ , and the probability of being 
subject to a random audit p. The utility function U (.)  is marginally positive with 
′ >U (.) 0  and strictly decreasing with the second order derivative ′′ <U (.) 0 , which 
means that the taxpayer is a risk-averse one who prefers a certain outcome to a 
gamble with the same (or even a higher) payoff in expected terms.
The correct net disposable income in case of full income disclosure is described 
by v y t= −( )1 . Thus one can interpret the first part of the expected utility formula-
tion as the situation in which no audit is performed and the utility is given by the 
argument ( ( ))v t y x+ − , the correct net income v augmented by what we will call 
the cheater’s premium, t y x−( ) , namely, the part of tax liability he saved by not 
paying taxes on the undeclared part. The second part of the weighting function de-
scribes the situation in which an audit takes place: the undeclared income y x−( )  is 
detected by the authority and the fully taxed correct net income v is reduced by the 
cheater’s penalty θ y x−( ) , i.e., the fine on the hidden income.
Commonly, decreasing absolute risk aversion is assumed, which describes the 
fact that—in absolute terms—the amount of risky investments increases with higher 
disposable income.
The first-order condition (FOC) for the optimal amount of income disclosure1 
of Eq. (5.1) is ∂
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. We find that in the AS 
specification an increase in the tax rate t  has ambiguous effects. On one hand, the 
correct net disposable income v decreases, which—under the assumption of de-
creasing absolute risk aversion2—should induce the individual to cheat less, leading 
1 The second-order condition is satisfied by the utility function’s being concave.
2 The concepts of absolute and relative risk aversion have been developed by Arrow (1965) and 
Pratt (1964) independently. The first measure describes the amount of wealth placed in risky ac-
tivities in absolute terms and the second expresses this amount in relative percentage terms.
EU p U v t y x pU v y x= −( ) + −( )( ) + − −( )( )1 θ
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to an income effect. On the other hand, with a higher tax rate, the attractiveness of 
the cheater’s premium t y x−( )  increases, whereas the cheater’s penalty θ y x−( )  
remains unaffected, which eventually makes tax evasion more profitable (substitu-
tion effect). The magnitude and sign of the final response depend on the shape of the 
utility function, in particular on how fast absolute risk aversion declines and thus its 
third-order derivative (Andreoni et al. 1998).
With the aim of reflecting the legal framework effective in a number of countries, 
such as the United States and Israel, in 1974, Shlomo Yitzhaki (1974) introduced a 
slight modification to the specification of the AS model by making the penalty de-
pend on the evaded taxes instead of the undeclared amount of income. The original 
expected utility expression becomes 
   (5.2)
and we find the following first-order conditions for optimality:
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. 
The taxpayer will evade as long as the expected payoff per monetary unit of evasion 
1− −p pθ  is greater than zero.
By directly comparing the F.O.C. of Eq. 5.2 with the original AS first-order con-
dition, we observe that the proportional multiplicative effect of taxes in the numera-
tor, which made evasion more attractive, disappears and what remains is only the 
income effect (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002). Overall, cheating will be reduced when 
the tax rate increases. Moreover, both the probability of an audit and the magnitude 
of the fine have a negative impact on evasion.
The Allingham–Sandmo–Yitzhaki (henceforth ASY) model stands out for its el-
egance and straightforwardness, and thus became the standard tool, or at least the 
starting point, in the analysis of the compliance decision. Yet an ever-growing body 
of empirical and experimental evidence has developed pointing out that the predic-
tions of the ASY model do not fully hold up in reality. In the following sections we 
will highlight some of the criticisms to this classic utilitarian approach.
5.3  Limits of Rational-Choice Theory
Presenting the decision of tax compliance as an individual-choice problem in order 
to resolve what could be well defined as an aggregate social problem has proven 
to lack significant elements that influence the process of human decision-making. 
The rational choice approach has been widely challenged, as described also by the 
American economist James M. Buchanan:
The economist rarely examines the presuppositions of the models with which he works. 
The economist simply commences with individuals as evaluating, choosing, and acting 
units. Regardless of the possible complexity of the processes or institutional structures from 
which outcomes emerge, the economist focuses on individual choices. […] Individuals […] 
are presumed able to choose in accordance with their own preferences, whatever these may 
be, and the economist does not feel himself obliged to inquire deeply into the content of 
these preferences (the arguments in individuals’ utility functions). (Buchanan 1987, p. 244)
EU p U v t y x pU v t y x= −( ) + −( )( ) + − −( )1 ( )θ
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Standard neoclassical models of economic theory are built on the assumption of in-
dividuals’ exhibiting rational behavior. Rationality in the economic context is inter-
preted as the individual’s capability of evaluating all possible outcomes in order to 
take the decision that yields the greatest benefit in terms of utility. Moreover, agents 
are also assumed to be aware of their own preferences and to be able to maximize 
their utility function given certain parameters. They do so in a purely self-interested 
way.
Accordingly, in the classic AS and ASY model of tax compliance the decision 
of how much to declare from one’s income to the tax authority is presented as a 
relatively simple portfolio choice. Taxpayers must decide how much of their in-
come they wish to allocate to the risky asset (tax evasion) and to the safe asset (tax 
compliance). Decision-makers are assumed to have full information about the audit 
probability, the fine, and the tax rate they are supposed to pay and make so-defined 
“rational choices under uncertainty.” The latter is engineered by assigning prob-
abilities to possible outcomes.
Portfolio theory and its basic assumptions of perfect rationality have been widely 
challenged by the science of behavioral economics, which deals with the social and 
cognitive aspects in the human decision-making process. By introducing elements 
of psychology into economic modeling, new points of view have been presented 
which are not necessarily in contrast with the neoclassical models.
Extensive experimental research has shown that individuals are only boundedly 
rational (see, for example, Conlisk 1996 for a survey on bounded rationality). The 
concept was already introduced in the 1950s by the work of Herbert A. Simon and 
has since been subsequently defined and modeled by numerous authors (Simon 
1982; Selten 2001; Simon 1972; Kahneman 2003). Examples of what could be those 
bounds to full rationality are information asymmetry and cognitive limitations.
How does bounded rationality apply to the tax evasion problem? First, most of 
the time citizens do not have complete information about the true audit probabilities 
and form subjective probability beliefs about the frequency of verifications by the 
tax authority. Also, tax code complexity and bureaucracy can lead to uncertainty 
not only about the fine parameter θ , but also about the correct tax rate itself, as 
pointed out by Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 852). Tax complexity leads to the need for 
tax practitioners and represents a potential source of inequity among the population, 
in particular with respect to education and socioeconomic status. These regressive 
effects stemming from inferior capabilities of interpreting the tax code and, as a 
consequence, finding ways to minimize the tax liability are also mentioned by Vogel 
(1974).
Second, optimizing a utility function based on some probabilities of possible 
outcomes might not be a straightforward process for everyone. It is demonstrated by 
numerous studies, as described in Reyna and Brainerd (2008), that there is a general 
lack of mathematical proficiency and subsequent difficulty in judging probabilities 
and risks among the population. Not only is it numeracy, but also tax literacy that 
plays a role in determining the correct level of the expected-utility parameters to be 
taken into consideration.
Tax literacy is tightly linked to the aforementioned tax code complexity. The first 
is the capability of applying the correct tax rate given a certain legal framework, 
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whereas the latter describes the structure and accessibility of that legal framework. 
The more complicated the design of the set of rules, the more important the capabil-
ity to interpret them correctly, in order words, ceteris paribus, the marginal return 
to tax literacy increases.
Finally, it is also assumed that taxpayers take decisions individually and in a self-
interested manner, but can we assume this mechanism to be compatible with the 
very purpose of taxes? Taxes are collected in order to finance public expenditures 
that again are designed to serve the community of taxpayers. This implies that tax 
evasion is a form of free-riding. Not paying one’s taxes has the effect that the other 
members of the community have to pay more in order to fund the public collective 
project. In that sense it might be necessary to consider social interactions and norms 
in order to capture the role of peer effects, positive and negative reciprocity, and in-
trinsic motivation in the decision-making process. We will consider these elements 
more in depth in Sect. 5.5.
5.4  The Expected-Utility Approach Under Scrutiny
In the ASY model the decision to pay taxes is presented as a lottery with two pos-
sible outcomes: audited and not audited. Taxpayers are then expected to decide how 
much to declare based on the probability of being audited and possibly fined. Fol-
lowing this logic and given the population-specific level of risk aversion, it should 
hence be possible for the lawmaker to provide society with a set of rules defining 
audit rates, tax rates, and fines which leads to collecting the maximum tax levy in a 
self-regulatory manner.
Individual heterogeneity is represented with regard to the attitude toward risk 
and captured by the functional form of the utility function, in particular its curva-
ture. A risk-averse individual is characterized by a concave utility function with a 
decreasing return to wealth in marginal terms.
The Arrow–Pratt measure of risk aversion in absolute terms describes the rela-
tionship between the second-order and the first-order derivative of the utility func-
tion, whereas the measure in relative terms describes the level of risk aversion with 
varying levels of wealth.
The level of risk aversion in the context of tax compliance has been studied by 
numerous authors. Alm et al. (1992a) showed that estimated Arrow–Pratt levels 
of relative risk aversion for the United States are incompatible with the empirical 
evidence of tax compliance. The real levels are between 1 and 2, but only a level 
of 30 would support observed tax compliance rates. Frey and Feld (2002) find that 
the observed compliance in Switzerland of 76.52 % would require a value for the 
parameter of relative risk aversion of 30.75, as opposed to the observed parameter 
values ranging from 1 to 2.
The empirical calibration values for the model were presented in Alm et al. 
(1992a), Andreoni et al. (1998), and Bernasconi (1998), with real-world average au-
dit rates ranging between 1 and 3 %, and the penalty rate, which we called θ i in our 
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specification, ranging from 0.5 to 2.0. The return to tax evasion in expected terms 
can be obtained using 1− −p pθ  and results in 91–98.5 %; hence all taxpayers 
should hide some of their income, which stands in contrast with the evidence show-
ing that only 30 % of taxpayers actually evade taxes Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007). 
Again, only unreasonably high levels of risk aversion could explain the levels of tax 
compliance found in reality.
Criticisms to the AS and the ASY models of tax evasion link back to the very 
same discussions around EUT itself. Decision-makers are defined to be (rational) 
expected utility maximizers if they meet the four basic criteria of the Von Neu-
mann–Morgenstern specification: (i) Completeness—preferences of individuals are 
well-defined; hence they are able to choose between two alternatives. (ii) Transi-
tivity—the choices are coherent; i.e., if outcome A is preferred to outcome B and 
B is preferred to C, then it must be that outcome A is preferred to outcome C. (iii) 
Independence—if gamble A is preferred to gamble B and another gamble C is added 
to both of them, then preferences do not change: the new gamble (A + C) must still 
be preferred to the new gamble (B + C). (iv) Continuity—given the preference 
ranking A  B C  then there must exist some value of p in a convex combina-
tion of A and C which makes the decision-maker indifferent to option B, such that 
pA+ − ≈( )1 p C B .
A challenge to the Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility specification is offered by 
Kahnemann and Tversky and their work on Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tver-
sky 1979) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), which 
shows inconsistency in preferences describing the nonlinear subjective reaction to 
probabilities. Starting from a reference income and moving into the gain domain, 
preferences are concave, whereas in the loss domain preferences are convex. The 
aim of determining a reference point from which to depart in defining the gain and 
the loss domain is to eliminate possible framing effects. Going back to our taxation 
framework, in Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) this reference point is defined as the 
legal after-tax income.
Moreover, concavity of gains and convexity of losses indicates the presence of 
a loss aversion, where losses are perceived as worse than gains in relative terms. 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) uses rank-dependent expected utility theory in 
order to define the probability weighting function. In that way decision-makers will 
tend to overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities. In taxation 
terms, such a mechanism implies that a realistic audit rate of, say, 0.01 is subjec-
tively interpreted as higher. Hence compliance for low audit rates increases with 
respect to the predictions of standard expected utility theory and is more in line with 
real world data.
This hypothesis was tested in the laboratory by Alm et al. (1992a). In their ex-
periment they set a cut-off level for the audit probability of 5 % below which a risk 
neutral expected utility maximizer should report zero income. Yet at a level of 2 % 
they still find significant compliance rates of around 50 %. Such a result could fit 
expected utility theory only by assuming extreme values of risk aversion. Still, the 
results are consistent with the predictions of Cumulative Prospect Theory which 
allows for subjects to subjectively perceive a higher audit rate than the given one. 
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They also find that the reactions to increases in audit probabilities are non-linear, 
with compliance rising less than the audit rate in relative terms.
An additional variation of their experiment consisted in a treatment with no pos-
sibility of being detected. Nonetheless, the average compliance rate was 20 % which 
makes the comparison with the neutral lottery set-up somewhat questionable and 
files Cumulative Prospect Theory as only a piece of the compliance puzzle.
5.5  Institutions, Social Norms and Psychological 
Factors—New Evidence from the Lab
Indeed, it has become quite clear that there are several further “ingredients” to be 
considered in order to get a better picture of the various aspects involved in the tax 
compliance process, aside from the fine rate, the available income, the audit fre-
quency and the tax rate. The homo economicus, the economic man, who is assumed 
to act rationally and in a self-interested manner, would be better off not paying taxes 
at all if we consider real-world audit rates, even under the assumption of extreme 
levels of risk aversion.
In this section, we will present some results of tax compliance experiments test-
ing for the impact of both the classical parameters and behaviorally driven elements 
which have been gradually introduced in the attempt to accommodate observed tax 
compliance data.
A typical tax compliance experiment is computer-based and consists of one or 
more rounds during which subjects are asked to take a decision on how much of 
their previously assigned income they want to declare to the tax authority, given 
the audit frequency, the fine in cases of detection and the tax rate. Thereafter their 
report may be randomly drawn for an audit and if they declared less than their gross 
income, the penalty is applied.
It is also to be mentioned, however, that experiments in economics are often 
subject to criticism with regards to their external validity. Guala and Mittone (2005) 
dedicate a section to the issues related to the tax compliance environment in the 
laboratory, naming as examples problems of scale, the game-like behavior of sub-
jects, the absence of social incentives (the “real” social environment is not part of 
the experiment) and the absence of social actors. The authors admit to the difficulty 
of generalizing laboratory results to the real world due to their inherent context-
specificity. Nevertheless, tax experiments may offer valuable cause-effect explana-
tions and might often even be the only chance to get additional data on the behav-
ioral dynamics behind the tax compliance decision (Alm et al. 1992b), given the 
difficulty of gathering truthful and reliable data on tax compliance.
Another criticism common to laboratory experiments in general is the use of stu-
dent subjects. This is addressed by Alm et al. (2010) and tested in a tax compliance 
experiment conducted with both, students and staff. Some variation was introduced 
between groups with regards to the level of certainty about the tax liability and 
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the existence of social programs aimed at positively inducing taxpayers (namely 
Income Tax Credit and Unemployment Benefits). They find that average compli-
ance rates within subjects (staff and students) indeed differ, but that changes within 
group treatments are alike. Similarly to Guala and Mittone (2005), their findings 
suggest that laboratory experiments are able to offer insights regarding marginal 
effects of parameter changes.
5.5.1  Testing the Classic Microeconomic Predictions
Experiments that test traditional microeconomic models such as those we have seen 
(AS and ASY), focus on manipulations of the enforcement regime, the tax rate and 
the fine rate. In an experiment conducted on law students, Friedland (1982) found 
for example that responsiveness to information about threat probability (audit) is 
higher than to information about threat magnitudes (fines).
Moreover, a number of experiments have been conducted to assess reactions to 
variations in the tax burdens. The ASY model predicts the compliance rate to be 
increasing in the tax rate, however, this cannot be confirmed by a number of find-
ings coming from the lab, which is commonly called the Yitzhaki puzzle. Alm et al. 
(1992b) find that tax evasion increases with the tax burden which is in-line with 
the empirical findings of Clotfelter (1983), even with the tax rate elasticity being 
similar3. Also the experimental subjects of Bernasconi et al. (2014) tend to increase 
their compliance when the tax burden decreases and vice versa. In addition they 
find that the reaction to tax cuts and tax rises is asymmetric with faster reaction to 
the first than to the latter.
Cultural factors and social norms might also play a role as shown by Alm et al. 
(1995), whose results will be presented more in detail in the next section. They find 
that Spanish test subjects behave according to the ASY model, increasing their com-
pliance with higher tax burdens at a positive rate of 0.94 whereas the U.S. subject 
pool confirms once again previous findings as in Clotfelter (1983) and Alm et al. 
(1992b)	with	a	negative	elasticity	of	around	−	0.5.
An attempt to modify the ASY model in order to match the experimental and 
empirical evidence has been made by Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007) who show 
that under prospect theory, hence depending on the reference point, tax evasion is 
increasing in the tax rate4.
Overall, similarly to empirical results, also in the laboratory higher-than-rational 
levels of compliance are usually observed, which prompted researchers to investi-
gate the role of determinants other than the classical triad of parameters.
3 around	−	0.5.
4 Strictly increasing for interior solutions and non-decreasing in case of boundary solutions when 
D* = 0 or D* = W.
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5.5.2  Tax Compliance as a Social Norm
The juxtaposition of the profit-maximizing homo economicus in the Smithian sense 
with Dahrendorf’s more other-regarding homo sociologicus became a necessary 
adjustment in the attempt to disentangle the fundamental drivers of the tax compli-
ance decision.
The latter characterization describes an economic agent who acts according to 
social norms and exhibits feelings such as guilt and anxiety. Roughly said, social 
norms are behavioral rules shared by other people who tend to judge them in a 
similar way. Elster (1989) cites some examples of social norms, such as norms of 
reciprocity, work norms and norms of cooperation. Special forms of norms of coop-
eration are given by norms of fairness.
The relevance to the tax compliance decision covers various aspects. First, per-
ceived peer-to-peer fairness which follows a logic similar to: “if others (don’t) pay 
their taxes then I am (not) going to pay them as well”. Second, the tax system itself 
might be evaluated in terms of fairness before taking a compliance decision. The 
items under scrutiny could be the magnitude of the fine, the frequency and modal-
ity of performed audits, the tax progressivity and thus the level of tax equity with 
respect to one’s income. Finally, taxes are levied in order to finance public projects 
which may lead to an evaluation of the personal gain from paying taxes and receiv-
ing public good consumption in return, or also of the efficiency of public spending.
One way to test the relevance of social norms is to conduct cross-country sur-
veys. By comparing responses from different cultures with similar fiscal systems, 
different tax attitudes and compliance rates emerge. Alm et al. (1995) provide a 
rough summary of the main findings of such studies. Drivers of tax compliance can 
be classified into moral (compliers view tax evasion as immoral and “moral appeal” 
tends to have positive effects on compliance), reputational (low social standing of 
tax evaders), peer effects (friends of tax evaders tend to evade more), perception of 
fairness, trust, and social cohesion. Alm et al. (1995) conducted a tax compliance 
experiment in the laboratory with Spanish subjects replicating an earlier study that 
was run in the United States. From the comparison of the two studies, it emerges 
that the Spanish subjects tend to comply less than their American counterparts in 
absolute terms. In the absence of a public good, with a fine rate of 2, a 30 % tax 
rate, and a 5 % probability of being audited, compliance of the American subjects is 
27 % on average, whereas in Spain it amounts to only 7 %. However, the Spaniards 
turn out to be much more sensitive toward fiscal policies, such as changes in the tax 
rate, the audit rate, or the magnitude of the fine. While reminding the reader that the 
only difference between the two experiments lies in the cultural origin of the subject 
pools, the authors conclude that the social norm of compliance, which can also be 
defined as “tax morality”, might be the reason for the difference in responses. It 
also emerges that there are different types of taxpayers: those who always comply 
and those who never comply, utility maximizers, subjects that behave according to 
prospect theory overweighting low probabilities, highly policy-sensitive subjects, 
and some who are at times cooperative and at times free-riders.
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The power of social norms is also determined by the interaction and enforcement 
among individuals. The relevance of peer effects is bolstered by Vogel’s analysis of 
a survey with Swedish respondents (Vogel 1974), which shows that contacts with 
tax evaders decreases tax compliance, weakening the social norm of compliance 
and, as a consequence, also the stigma of evading. On the other hand, conforming 
to tax-paying peers might also yield a positive return, based on the individual’s level 
of intrinsic tax morale.
A formal model, which is still embedded in the EUT framework, was developed 
by Myles and Naylor (1996). Conformity to social groups yields an additional pay-
off to the taxpayer, which depends on the size of the group itself. Moreover, the 
non-evasion equilibrium could potentially be turned over by small changes in the 
tax rate, leading to an evasion epidemic with tipping point behavior.
Tightly linked to the concept of social norms and group conformity are the mod-
els considering the psychic costs of evasion, as described by Gordon (1989). The 
evaded amount becomes a function of an additional parameter which is determined 
by the personal level of morale and peer effects. The positive relationship between 
tax morale and tax compliance has been tested and confirmed numerous times in 
the laboratory (for an extensive survey and discussion of experimental results see 
Torgler 2002). In a separate article, Torgler (2003) shows empirically that the level 
of tax morale itself is influenced by formal and informal institutions, such as direct 
participation rights and trust in the government. He defines tax morale as “the in-
trinsic motivation to pay taxes” or “the willingness to pay taxes by the individuals.”
We have seen that the tax-compliance decision is not only determined by the 
absolute levels of the classic parameters, which are the fine rate, the tax rate, and 
the probability of being caught in a random audit. Psychological and cultural fac-
tors also play a role, as well as peer interactions. The latter exhibit imitative patterns 
based on lagged events and give rise to the need for a dynamic modeling approach. 
In the following section we will present the tool of agent-based modeling, which 
represents a way to bridle the rise in complexity of stylized facts that potentially 
influence the tax-compliance decision.
5.6  From Top Down to Bottom Up—From Experimental 
Economics to an Experimental Economy
The ultimate purpose of research on tax evasion is undoubtedly to find policies able 
to increase tax compliance and hence the overall tax levy. A number of interplays 
and complexities characterizing the system (e.g., country) under analysis have to be 
considered in order to fit the outcome-predicting model as closely as possible to the 
underlying reality without too much loss of generality.
It is, however, a challenging task and not always possible to disentangle the be-
havioral and economic elements affecting the tax-compliance decision by analyzing 
the available empirical data. Parameter values needed for a correct calibration could 
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be obtained, for example, by performing field studies and conducting laboratory 
experiments. The idea of using experimental data (but not solely) in order to feed 
a computer-simulated replica of society was suggested by Duffy (2006), and even 
though calibration with experimental data has not yet become a widespread habit, 
we will see one agent-based model that put these suggestions into practice.
Agent-based models offer an alternative approach to deal with complexity, and 
the available tools make it possible to take interactions and heterogeneities into ac-
count without necessarily abandoning the simplicity of representation. It is possible 
to artificially recreate an experimental economy that reacts according to the model 
we choose. The parameter values can be calibrated according to experimental or 
empirical findings; and, most importantly, this technique allows simulation with 
heterogeneous agents and social interactions in a dynamic environment. The results 
of agent-based simulations are then compared with real data, allowing for a more 
detailed understanding of the underlying social and behavioral dynamics.
5.6.1  Group Conformity and Social Norms
Bloomquist (2006) reviewed three agent-based simulation models applied to an 
environment of tax compliance, namely, Mittone and Patelli (2000), Davis et al. 
(2003), and Bloomquist (2004).
Mittone and Patelli (2000) use the model of Myles and Naylor (1996) as a basis, 
which considers group conformity and the social norm of tax compliance. Psy-
chological costs are also included in the model, as originally proposed by Gordon 
(1989), but without making them depend on the evaded amount. The underlying 
idea is that, no matter how much income is hidden, once the decision to evade is put 
into practice, the “honest citizen” status is lost.
Agent heterogeneity is captured by introducing three types of subjects: the hon-
est taxpayer, the imitative taxpayer, and the perfect free-rider, each with his or her 
own specific utility function. Honest agents achieve positive marginal utility effects 
from conforming to social rules; free-riders will contribute as little as possible; and 
imitative taxpayers will use the population mean of compliance as a benchmark, 
which is also in a way in line with the findings on peer effects described by Vogel 
(1974) and the findings of Porcano (1988), that the perception of existing evasion 
has a positive and significant effect on the own level of evasion. Additional util-
ity gains are obtained from the introduction of a public good that depends on the 
amount of tax levy, as considered by the theoretical model of Cowell and Gordon 
(1988).
Finally, the behavioral characteristics of single agents are not static, but subject 
to a stochastic updating process, a genetic procedure where probabilities of type-
survival are calculated based on individual utility gains over total population utility 
gains.
Decision rules on how much to declare follow a learning mechanism with choic-
es being updated based on the success or failure of past compliance decisions.
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The random element in the behavioral switching algorithm, in combination with 
the feature of imitative behavior, triggers a cycle that allows for the model to react 
to audit rates that are close to zero, pushing compliance to a near-zero level, even if 
all agents were initially honest.
On the other hand, when audits are introduced, only honest taxpayers remain 
after a certain number of rounds. It is interesting to notice that the type of audit 
procedure, uniform versus those aimed at the lower tail of contributions, does not 
change this result.
Another model considering peer-oriented behavior is the Multi-Agent Based 
Simulation (MABS) developed by Davis et al. (2003) using the software Math-
ematica. The behavioral classification of taxpayers is similar to the previous model: 
there are honest, susceptible (to others’ behavior), and evading agents.
Initially, there are two randomly assigned types: honest and evading. An honest 
taxpayer might, depending on the “infection rate,” become a susceptible one in case 
a (randomly chosen) acquaintance happens to be an evader. Susceptible agents form 
beliefs about the severity of the tax enforcement regime by observing the mean 
audit frequency of their peers in the previous period. They become evaders if this 
perceived severity is below a certain threshold. Finally, evaders become honest tax-
payers if the belief about the severity of the audit regime is above a certain threshold 
or if they observe a social norm of tax compliance. The existence of a social norm of 
tax compliance is confirmed by having a certain number of honest taxpayers among 
the own acquaintances.
Also, evading agents become honest after a tax audit. The authors follow the 
literature on availability (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) and vividness, assuming 
that the subjectively determined probability of being audited is judged to be high-
er after a recent audit experience. This assumption, however, stands in contrast 
with the experimental findings of Mittone (2006) and Maciejovsky et al. (2007), 
who observed negative post-audit responses, which are likely to be due to the so-
called Bomb-Crater Effect, according to which most recent events are judged to be 
unlikely to occur again immediately. A second cause is a loss-repair mechanism 
as described by Maciejovsky et al. (2007) and suggested also by Andreoni et al. 
(1998) where the fined taxpayer tries to recover the sum by evading more in the 
subsequent round.
By manipulating the starting proportion of evading and honest agents and letting 
the systems evolve over 2,000 rounds, Davis et al. (2003) find that changes in the 
audit rates from 0.002 to 0.030 in steps of 0.002 lead to “tipping point” behavior 
with abrupt changes in compliance equilibria. In all set-ups societies converge to 
total honesty at an audit rate of only 0.03. Although the latter result is not supported 
by empirical findings, it is still notable that the audit rate may be used as a device to 
prevent a non-compliance epidemic from happening.
The authors suggest establishing a similar experimental environment with social 
norms and group conformity in order to confirm the robustness of their finding.
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5.6.2  The Tax Compliance Simulator (TCS)—Playing with 
Complexity
Bloomquist (2004) uses the software NetLogo in order to simulate a more complex 
agent-based environment. His Tax Compliance Simulator (TCS) is capable of test-
ing the effects of variations in audit rates, fine rates, income visibility (wages and 
salaries versus other sources of income), auditor efficacy, and audit celerity after the 
event of an evasion. What is measured are direct effects of audits given by the addi-
tional levy, indirect effects of audits experienced by peers, and post-audit responses.
The interface of the TCS is also quite intuitive for a non-technical user and was 
illustrated in Bloomquist (2006, p. 423). It is composed by various sliders (such 
as tax rate, audit rate, penalty, etc.) through which it is possible to manipulate the 
desired parameter values before starting the simulation.
Diagrams at the top show the evolution of the variables of interest, as, for ex-
ample, the amount of reported tax over time, whereas the distribution dynamic of 
full evaders, partial compliers, and full compliers appears in the window containing 
“turtles,” the NetLogo labeling of what we called agents.
The TCS features both overweighting of low audit probabilities and overestima-
tion. Taxpayers tend to overweight low probabilities of audit, as predicted by pros-
pect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and experimentally assessed by Alm 
et al. (1992). All probabilities were given, but there was still evidence of people 
typically overweighting these probabilities. Overestimation, on the other hand, is a 
bias which is a less numerical and more psychological phenomenon: it may depend 
on the subjects’ perception of the auditing mechanism and also past audit experi-
ences, as hypothesized in Kastlunger et al. (2009).
In order to help account for the opportunities to evade, it is possible to determine 
the percentage of visible income. Visible income being subject to third-party infor-
mation reporting, such as salaries, is assumed to be entirely declared, which is in 
line with empirical data. However, once the agent does not declare her full income 
it is not always true that when an audit is performed, the full evasion is detected. To 
account for such partial detection, a detection rate is introduced and the cost com-
ponent of the decision to evade is modified accordingly.
Finally, also borrowing constraints which could incentivize lower compliance 
and discount rates for delayed detection with respect to the evasion event itself are 
taken into account.
Unlike the first two models, the TCS uses actual empirical evidence from IRS 
audit data when calibrating the parameters of the MABS model in order to achieve 
an outcome which is as close as possible to observed levels of compliance.
5.6.3  Experimental Economics—Calibration with Experimental 
Data
In an agent-based exercise simulating tax compliance behavior of small-business 
owners Bloomquist (2011) employs a relatively simple evolutionary game-theoretic 
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approach and uses experimental data in order to calibrate the model programmed in 
NetLogo. Taxpayers this time are of four different types: Honest, Strategic, Defiant, 
and Random. Behavior of small-business owners is hypothesized to be similar to 
that of laboratory subjects and in order to prove this claim the author relies on third-
party experimental results (Alm and Mckee 2006; Alm et al. 2008). In these tax-
compliance experiments subjects were tested for various behavioral mechanisms, 
but for comparability reasons only data of the “no treatment” subject pools was ex-
trapolated for the calibration purpose at issue. Compliance rate histograms clearly 
exhibit the typical bimodal distribution around zero and one, hence confirming the 
existence of honest and defiant taxpayers.
Initially the combination of behavioral taxpayer types is selected such that labo-
ratory results in terms of mean and mode are matched as closely as possible. In this 
first run no neighborhood effects were included because laboratory subjects were 
not able to see what others were doing. From the comparison of the simulation re-
sults for five different audit rates from 0 to 0.40 with and without risk aversion,5 it 
can be inferred that the inclusion of risk aversion with probability weighting gives 
more precise results for audit rates ranging from 0 to 0.10, confirming the findings 
of Bernasconi (1998).
As a second step four different scenarios6 of agent-based modeling were matched 
to real data gathered from the IRS National Research Program (NRP) study. The 
subsample of individuals with income stemming only from Sole Proprietorship 
(Schedule C—Profit or Loss From Business) was used and cases of overcompli-
ance were normalized to full compliance. None of these four simulations was able 
to match the average NRP compliance rate at which point the agent group defined 
as “random taxpayers” was excluded from the runs, assuming that small-business 
owners exhibit less random behavior than the students who participated in the lab.
The best match with the new setup was found in absence of neighborhood ef-
fects, which is also clear from the comparison of the histogram of compliance rates 
of the simulation with real data excluding neighborhood effects from playing a 
dominant role.
5.6.4  A Model of Citizenship
Pellizzari and Rizzi (2014) developed an agent-based model of tax compliance that 
contemplates two types of agents: taxpayers and the government. Taxpayers maxi-
mize their utility based on net income and also considering the perceived level of 
public expenditure. Again, the role of the public good is considered as being rel-
evant to the tax-compliance decision, but in a more sophisticated and dynamic way 
than we already saw in Mittone and Patelli (2000). In addition, an array of individu-
al characteristics are included—namely, risk aversion; relative preference for public 
expenditure; an innate tendency to pay taxes, which we could define as intrinsic 
5 Risk aversion in this case describes the mechanism of overweighting small probabilities of being 
audited as described (also in Bernasconi, 1998).
6 Risk aversion versus no risk aversion and neighborhood effects versus no neighborhood effects.
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tax morale; and, as in Mittone and Patelli (2000), group conformity modeled as the 
expectation about other agents’ compliance behavior. Audit probabilities are not 
exactly known and inferred subjectively by observing audit dynamics among peers.
Moreover, the authors propose three different institutional frameworks based on 
the power a government is able to exert (high, average, and low). The taxpayers are 
divided into three types based on their level of “citizenship,” which is defined as 
a combination of the preference for public expenditure, group conformity, and tax 
morale.
Under a weak enforcement regime and with a low level of citizenship the authors 
observed high levels of tax evasion. Even with high levels of enforcement, full com-
pliance cannot be achieved. Moreover, ceteris paribus, the higher the tax rate, the 
lower the compliance level of their agents. This finding is in contrast with the pre-
dictions of the theoretical EUT model developed by Yitzhaki (1974) but confirms a 
large body of empirical evidence.
Government power still plays a significant role in societies with an average level 
of citizenship, even though elasticities decrease with respect to low levels of citi-
zenship. Finally, the role of government almost disappears for high levels of citizen-
ship, where tax evasion approaches near-zero levels regardless of the enforcement 
regime.
Overall, citizenship is found to have a larger marginal effect on compliance than 
enforcement power by the government, but both concepts are necessary to enhance 
the level of tax compliance in a society.
To take the findings further, it could also be interesting to read these results in 
light of the somewhat contrasting prescriptions coming from the literature on moti-
vation crowding-out, surveyed for example by Frey and Jegen (2001): the intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes could therefore be decreased by the mere presence of an 
extrinsic mechanism of punishment.
5.7  Conclusions
The aim of this survey was to take the reader on a tour through the very rich body 
of existing literature on tax evasion. Not only the plurality of determinants of tax 
compliance, but also the multiplicity of methodologies and analytical approaches 
make it a challenging task to provide policy makers with useful indications.
We started from the classical models of tax evasion which represent an ideal 
starting point for more realistic considerations and modifications. Thereafter, in-
stitutional, social and psychological factors, among others, have been found to be 
highly relevant when a taxpayer decides how much to declare to the tax authority. 
Also, survey data and laboratory experiments have shown that interaction among 
taxpayers in the form of peer effects and psychic costs of evasion cannot be disre-
garded.
As the famous physicist Stephen Hawking so wisely predicted, “the next century 
will be the century of complexity.” We now face the moment in which we have to 
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tame and coordinate all these different elements in order to maintain the informative 
value of new findings.
To do so, the ceteris paribus approach and the search for equilibria should be re-
laxed, giving space to a new notion of ceteris mutabilibus7 and asymptotic dynam-
ics. Innovative tools are needed, and the impressive computing power of modern 
devices serves this purpose well. We presented some examples of agent-based mod-
els to provide the reader with food for thought by highlighting their flexibility in 
accounting for both heterogeneous agents as well as different kinds of parameters, 
in addition to the possibility for interaction and the dynamic nature of such simula-
tions. Additionally, individual characteristics can be matched with evidence stem-
ming from human subjects tested in the lab, as we have seen in Bloomquist (2011).
The future focus of research on tax compliance should hence be on continu-
ing the multidisciplinary approach in determining the drivers of tax evasion, on 
one hand, while properly administering, elaborating and integrating old and new 
findings, on the other, with the final aim being to provide policymakers with ever-
improving policy advice on how to increase the overall level of tax compliance.
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